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CASENOTES

SCHOOLS AND SCHOOL DISTRICTS-State Legislature's
Exclusion of School Systems from Municipal Government Consolidation Constitutes Unconstitutional Public School Segregation Requiring an Interdistrict Remedy. United States v. Board
of School Commissioners, 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976).
In 1954, the United States Supreme Court declared that segregation of
public school children solely on the basis of race is a deprivation of equal
protection as guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. 1
In the school desegregation decisions which followed, the Court gave federal
courts broad remedial powers to eliminate school segregation that was the result of state action. 2 Recently, however, the Court limited these equitable
powers in the area of school desegregation when it ruled that federal courts
may not require desegregation plans which cross the boundaries of separate,
autonomous school districts when de jure segregation is confined to only one
of the districts. 3 In short, interdistrict relief may not ordinarily be afforded
for purely intradistrict violations. While this rule is not absolute, 4 subsequent
1. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (in
formulating remedies, courts may examine racial quotas, attendance zones, and pupil
transportation); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968) (district court must
retain jurisdiction until state imposed segregation is completely removed); Griffin v.
County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (district court may enjoin county government's
financial support of segregated private schools and order government to levy taxes to
finance the operation of integrated public schools); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)
(courts should scrutinize whether program of school authorities will further earliest
practicable desegregation); Brown v. Bd. of Educ:, 349 U.S. 294 (1955) (district
courts to retain jurisdiction to ensure effective transition to non-discriminatory school
system).
3. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). De jure segregation is synonymous with state-sanctioned segregation. Segregation which is notl the product of state
action, nor attributable to the state is de facto. The distinguishing characteristic between de jure and de facto discrimination is the intent to discriminate. See Keyes
v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg
Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1971). But see Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413
U.S. 189, 224 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring).
4. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 746 (1974). Accord, Hills v. Gautreaux,
425 U.S. 284 (1976); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), aff'd mem.,
423 U.S. 963 (1975).
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decisions by the Court have not fully articulated the interdistrict-intradistrict
distinctions. Thus, the lower courts have received little guidance as to
whether particular acts of de jure segregation demand interdistrict relief and
whether principles established in single-district cases are applicable to multidistrict litigation.

In United States v. Board of School Commissioners,5 the

United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit provided an exception
to the interdistrict restrictions by sustaining a school desegregation order that
required busing of school children from Indianapolis to suburban Indianapolis
schools where a consolidation plan for the governments of Indianapolis and
its predominantly white suburbs excluded consolidation of the school systems.
The case represents an attempt to blend the reasoning utilized in singledistrict school desegregation decisions with that followed by the Court in
multidistrict cases. On certiorari, however, the Supreme Court vacated this
decision and remanded the case to the Seventh Circuit for reconsideration
in light of intervening Supreme Court decisions which addressed the issue of
intent to discriminate. 6
School Commissioners began in 1968 as a school desegregation suit brought
by the Justice Department, which alleged racial discrimination in the operation of Indianapolis public schools. At trial, the district court found that the
school board had been illegally operating a segregated school system both before and after the Supreme Court's 1954 ruling that public school segregation
was unconstitutional. 7 The court concluded that through gerrymandering of
school attendance zones, 8 segregation of faculty, 9 use of optional attendance
zones, 10 and a pattern of school construction and site selection,"' the school

5. 541 F.2d 1211 (7th Cir. 1976). The suit was brought by the United States
Government in accordance with Section 407 of the Civil ,Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 2000c-6(a), (b) (1970), which empowers the Attorney General to bring school
desegregation suits on behalf of plaintiffs he deems unable to initiate and maintain
appropriate actions.
6. 429 U.S. 1068 (1977). See notes 60-69 & accompanying text infra.
7. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 665-70, 677-78
(S.D. Ind. 1971).
8. Id. at 665, 667, 669-70. The court found that school children were assigned
to schools distant from their homes when attendance at schools nearest their homes
would have resulted in desegregation. Id. at 665. Similarly, school children were transferred and transported from overcrowded schools of one race to schools of the same
race rather than to closer schools of a different race. Id. at 669.
9. Id. at 670.
10. Id. at 668.
11. Id. at 665, 667-69. The instances of this particular practice were numerous
and varied. Additions were built at black schools and then black students attending
predominantly white schools were zoned into them; the converse was done for white
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board had violated its duty to provide an integrated school system. Consequently, the court enjoined the board from further acts of discrimination and
ordered it to take affirmative steps to eliminate the segregation existing in
the Indianapolis schools. In addition, the court ordered the United States to
join the Indiana Attorney General and other school districts in the Indianapolis metropolitan area as codefendants so that the court might consider
the propriety of interdistrict relief. 12 The Seventh Circuit unanimously
affirmed the decision on appeal, finding that the acts of the defendant school
board supported the inference that a clear pattern of purposeful racial dis13
crimination existed.
In a subsequent trial on the issue of proper relief, 14 the district court de-

cided that the acts of de jure segregation practiced by the defendant school
board could be imputed to the state because the Indiana Constitution placed

public schools under the state's direct control and supervision. 15 Based upon
evidence of accelerating white emigration from Indianapolis, the district court
16
decided that an Indianapolis-only desegregation plan would not be durable.
students attending predominantly black schools. Id. at 667. The school board also
constructed additions to large, predominantly black schools when adding classrooms to
smaller, white schools nearby would have resulted in desegregation. Id. New schools
attended solely by one race were constructed adjacent to older schools attended by the
other race. Id. at 668.
12. Id. at 679-80. As a result, 19 school corporations were added as defendants,
nine of which were not within the boundaries of Marion County in which Indianapolis
is located. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'r's, 368 F. Supp. 1191, 1195-96 (S.D.
Ind. 1973).
13. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 474 F.2d 81, 84-88 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973).
14. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Ind. 1973).
15. Id. at 1200-02 (citing IND. CONsT. art. 9, § 1; art. 8, § 1).
16. The evidence indicated that whites emigrate to the suburbs at an accelerated
pace as black pupil enrollment in public schools reaches a fixed percentage and that,
if the remedy were limited to Indianapolis, the exodus would create a black majority
in the city school system within three years. This is commonly known as the "tipping
point" theory. According to the late Yale law professor, Alexander M. Bickel, "white
flight" is dependent on the racial composition of the schools. Once the percentage
of blacks in the schools reaches a certain percentage-the "tipping point"-whites begin
to flee to the suburbs. Bickel, Desegregation: Where Do We Go From Here?, THE
NEw REPUBLIC, Feb. 7, 1970, at 20. The proposition that white flight is a response
to school desegregation has been a subject of much dispute. See generally J. COLEMAN,
OFFICE OF EDUC., U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (1966); Armour, The Evidence on Busing, PUBLIC INTEREST,
No. 28 (1972).
But see G. ORFIELD, SYMPOSIUM ON SCHOOL DESEGREGATION AND
WHITE FLIGHT (1975)

(limited publication available from Center for National Policy

Review, Washington, D.C.).

Mr. Orfield concludes that the current data on white

flight is inconclusive.
Of greater importance to this article is the use of white flight evidence by the courts.
In his opinion after the original trial on the merits, United States v. Bd. of School
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The court therefore ordered the immediate enactment of a plan requiring the
busing of black Indianapolis school children to suburban schools to provide
interim relief. Because only the rights of black Indianapolis school children
had been violated, however, the court refused to order the busing of white
suburban school children. The court also refused to require specific legislation to end school segregation in Indianapolis permanently, unless the state
legislature defaulted in its duty to propose and implement a workable plan.
Instead, the court issued a supplemental memorandum to the legislature con17
taining guidelines for appropriate relief.
On appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court had acted properly in finding that the state had an affirmative duty to desegregate the
Indianapolis schools,1 8 but that the inclusion in the desegregation order of
school districts outside Marion County, the county in which Indianapolis is
located, was both improper and excessive in light of the recent interdistrict
restrictions promulgated by the Supreme Court.19 Those constraints further
prompted the Court of Appeals to remand the case for a determination as
to whether a 1969 consolidation of the governments of Indianapolis and its
20
Marion County suburbs, which excluded unification of the school systems,
was unconstitutional.

21

On remand, after conducting a further evidentiary hearing, the district
court determined that the express exclusion of city schools from consolidation
Comm'rs, 332 F. Supp. 655, 676-79 (S.D. Ind. 1971), and in his opinion after remand
from the second appeal, United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180,
184 (S.D. Ind. 1975), District Court Judge Dillin concluded that intradistrict relief
would not be durable because evidence presented at trial indicated that the Indianapolis
public school system was reaching the tipping point. Therefore, in the latter decision
he ordered an interdistrict remedy, stating that while "white flight may not be used
as an excuse for inaction; it may, however, supply the reason for a particular kind
of action." Id.
17. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 368 F. Supp. 1191, 1223 (S.D. Ind.
1973). The guidelines addressed the issues of time for legislative response, the propriety
of allowing school districts to remain separate and autonomous while participating in
the remedy stage, the method and scope of allowable busing of school children, and
possible financing arrangements for transporting pupils away from their own school
districts. Id. at 1227-31.
18. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 503 F.2d 68, 80 (7th Cir. 1974).
19. Id. at 86. See notes 3 & 4 & accompanying text supra.
20. In 1969, after the initial suit had been filed but before it was argued, the Indiana
General Assembly had passed legislation enabling the governments of Indianapolis and
suburban Marion County to consolidate, but without mandating a concomitant unification of the school system. At the time of the creation of this new government entity
(commonly known as Uni-Gov) 95% of the black residents of Marion County lived in
Indianapolis, as did 50% of the white residents of the county. Black enrollment comprised 36% of the total Indianapolis public school enrollment. 541 F.2d at 1215.
21. The question was argued but not decided at trial. 332 F. Supp. at 675-76, 679.
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under the plan was an abdication by the General Assembly of its affirmative
duty to alleviate segregation within Indianapolis and was a sufficient
22
hindrance to desegregation so as to warrant a limited interdistrict remedy.
Accordingly, the court ordered that a specified number of city students be
transported to suburban schools to bring the percentage of black enrollment
in those schools up to fifteen percent. In addition, the court enjoined the
local housing authority from locating additional public housing units within
the city because the court concluded that this practice had contributed to
23
racial containment and had advanced school segregation.
The Seventh Circuit sustained the district court order 24 over a stern dissent
which stressed that recent Supreme Court decisions require that invidious
racial purpose be demonstrated by more than disparate racial impact. 25 The
court relied on decisions by the Supreme Court which established that school
districts found to be operating illegal dual school systems may not contract
their territories in order to avoid desegregation, 26 and that state legislatures
22. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 419 F. Supp. 180, 183 (S.D. Ind. 1975).
23. Id. at 186.
24. United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211, 1212 (7th Cir. 1976).
25. 541 F.2d at 1224 (Tone, J., dissenting). In dissent, Judge Tone concluded that
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated the requisite discriminatory intent on the part of
the legislature in its facilitation of Marion County consolidation through school system
exclusion. This opinion was based upon the Supreme Court's decision in Washington
v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976), which held that black applicants for police employment
in the District of Columbia could not successfully claim that they had been the victims
of racial discrimination solely because black applicants failed an entrance employment
test at a significantly higher rate than whites. In Washington, the court noted that
earlier civil rights decisions had not established "that a law, neutral on its face and
serving ends otherwise within the power of government to pursue, is invalid under the
Equal Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one race
than another." Id. at 242.
Judge Tone's reading of Washington as requiring a demonstration of invidious intent
is undoubtedly correct, but his application of that holding to the facts in School Commissioners appears overly broad, particularly in light of other language from that opinion
which favorably cited a Supreme Court decision for the proposition that "in proper
circumstances, the racial impact of a law, rather than its discriminatory purpose, is
the critical factor" in determining whether there has been intent to discriminate. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. at 242, (citing Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia,
407 U.S. 451 (1972)). See notes 29-35 & accompanying text infra. Particularly important to the Court in Washington was the background of de jure segregation preceding
school system withdrawal in Emporia. See 426 U.S. at 243. While not expressly stating
its own methodology for finding creation of Uni-Gov to be discriminatory (and, therefore, by implication, purposely discriminatory), the majority's discussion in School Commissioners of the history of de jure segregation in Indianapolis suggests reasoning similar
to that employed by the Supreme Court in reaffirming Emporia in Washington. See
United States v. Bd. of School Comm'rs, 541 F.2d 1211, 1215-20 (7th Cir. 1976).
26. Wright v. Council of City of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451 (1972); United States v.
Scotland Neck Bd. of Educ., 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
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may not exclude school districts from statewide school reorganization plans
if the exclusions make the attainment of school desegregation more difficult
than the attainment of other related governmental ends. 27 Thus, the court
ruled that the Indiana General Assembly, by enacting legislation which
facilitated exclusion of Marion County schools from governmental consolidation, had attempted to evade its duty to dismantle the dual school system
28
in Indianapolis.
To reach the decision that the state's actions required interdistrict relief,
the appellate court had to find either that the discriminatory actions taken
by the school board and the state prior to Marion County consolidation were
interdistrict in character or that the exclusion of schools from consolidation
was an interdistrict violation on its own. In order to determine whether the
factual circumstances in School Commissioners supported either conclusion,
a basic understanding of the standards for obtaining interdistrict school
desegregation relief is required.
I.

THE BOUNDARY MANIPULATION DECISIONS

Among the numerous devices utilized by state and local governments to
avoid court-ordered public school desegregation has been manipulation of
school district boundaries. The Supreme Court faced the boundary manipulation issue in Wright v. Council of the City of Emporia29 and United States
v. Scotland Neck Board of Education,3" companion cases which raised the
question of whether federal courts may enjoin state and local officials from
fashioning a new, smaller school district from an existing district that has not
completed the process of dismantling a dual system. In Emporia, the Court
reinstated a district court's injunction, which had been issued to prevent officials of the city from separating their school system from that of the surrounding county, because the proposed withdrawal would have increased segregation in the remainder of the county school system. 3 1 The court reasoned that
"[s]ince the city and county constituted but one unit for the purpose of student assignments during the entire time that the dual school system was
maintained," they had been properly considered as a unit for the purpose
27. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975), aff'd mein., 423 U.S.
963 (1975).
28. See note 20 supra.
29. 407 U.S. 451 (1972).
30. 407 U.S. 484 (1972).
31. 407 U.S. at 462. The Court stated that "[tihough the purpose of the new
school districts was found to be discriminatory [in previous school desegregation cases,
the] holdings rested not on motivation or purpose, but on the effect of the action

upon the dismantling of the dual school systems involved." (emphasis in the original).
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of dismantling that system; 32 therefore, a finding that the city would be
operating a dual system after its withdrawal was unnecessary.3 3" Moreover,
the Court eschewed any need to determine whether the dominant purpose
behind the proposed withdrawal was racial so long as the effect of the action
was to impede desegregation of the county school system 4 Four Justices
dissented, primarily because the city and county each would have been
operating a unitary system after the withdrawal and because the proposed
establishment of the Emporia system was not motivated by invidious racial
35
considerations.
In Scotland Neck, the same reasoning employed by the majority in
Emporia was utilized to reinstate an injunction issued by a district court to
prohibit the North Carolina legislature from creating a new school system
from part of an existing system that was under a desegregation order. As
in Emporia, the legislature's action would have impeded desegregation of the
existing school system. Unlike Emporia, however, the decision was unanimous, with the Emporia dissenters unwilling to ascribe a nondiscriminatory
motive to the defendants. The Emporia dissenters distinguished the two
cases on the basis that a history of independent governmental operation of
the city and county existed in Emporia, while no similar history existed in
Scotland Neck. Taken together, the Emporia and Scotland Neck decisions

stand for the proposition that new, smaller school systems may not be created
from school systems under present desegregation orders when the effect is
to inhibit the transformation from a dual to a unitary system.
II.
A.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARDS FOR INTERDISTRICT RELIEF

The Evolution of Milliken v. Bradley

Prior to 1972, the Supreme Court had not been faced with a federal court
school desegregation decision mandating interdistrict relief for acts of de jure
segregation. The Emporia and Scotland Neck decisions had encouraged civil
rights activists to believe that when faced with the problem, the Court would
continue to grant federal courts broad equitable powers to reshape school district boundaries. In the first interdistrict school desegregation case, Bradley
32. id. at 459-60.
33.

Id. at 459.

34. The Court characterized such an inquiry as being "as irrelevant as it is fruitless."
Id. at 462. In light of its decision in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976),
the Court now appears to be saying that what was once fruitless is now ripe. See
notes 60-66 & accompanying text supra.
35. 407 U.S. at 479, 482. The dissenters also believed that discriminatory purpose

may not always be presumed solely from discriminatory effect, 407 U.S. at 483.
position was later to become law in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).

This
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v. School Board 3 however, the Court split evenly over the issue of whether
metropolitan school districts should be consolidated to remedy school segregation in the core city. The effect of the Court's treatment of the case was
to sustain the Fourth Circuit's refusal to consolidate Richmond, Virginia with
its suburbs. While recognizing that racial containment policies practiced by
local, state, and federal officials had partially produced and perpetuated the
exclusion of blacks from suburban housing, 7 the appeals court had declined
to find the defendant school districts in violation of the Constitution since they
were each operating unitary school systems, had not cooperated in creating
or maintaining the racial differentiation between Richmond and its suburbs,
and initially had not drawn the school district lines for invidious purposes.
The concern that Bradley foreshadowed a restriction of the federal courts'
equitable powers was allayed somewhat by the Court's decision that same
term in Keyes v. School District No. 1,38 the first northern school desegregation case to reach the Supreme Court. In Keyes, the Court ruled that proof
that racial segregation in one segment of a school district resulted from intentional acts by school officials would raise a rebuttable "common sense" presumption that similar segregation elsewhere in the district also resulted from
intentional action by officials.8 9 Although the Court recognized that a purpose or intent to segregate must exist in order to find acts violative of the
Constitution, 40 it rejected the notion that such motive must be shown at each
school and in each area sought to be desegregated. Keyes, therefore, added
an element to the school desegregation equation which, if applicable to multidistrict situations, would circumvent the possible restrictions to interdistrict
relief posed by Bradley.
The Supreme Court's 1974 decision in Milliken v. Bradley,41 however,
rejected application of the Keyes presumption to multidistrict situations and
established what are now the standards for interdistrict relief. A five
member majority of the Court ruled that a federal district court may not require an interdistrict remedy for intradistrict de jure segregation unless the
violations are shown to have had substantial adverse effects in districts other
36. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), af 'd sub nom. School

Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973).

For an extensive discussion of the

Richmond litigation, see Leedes and O'Fallon, School Desegregation in Richmond: A

Case History, 10 U. RICH. L. REV. 1 (1975).
37. Id. See Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d at 1065, 1070.
38. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
39. Id. at 201-03, 208.
40. Id. at 208.
41. 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
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than where they occurred. 42 Inclusion in the remedial order of school districts whose racial compositions were not the product of state action, reasoned
the Court, would exceed the powers of the federal courts to grant relief that is
commensurate with the constitutional violation. In short, the Court decided
that "the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent of constitutional violation."' 43 In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Burger
noted that the record of the district court was barren of any finding that the
defendant school systems, other than Detroit, had operated dual school systems or that the Detroit violations caused school segregation in any other defendant school district. There was a similar absence of evidence that
boundary lines of the affected school districts had been estabished to foster
segregation in the schools. Nor had the majority of the school districts included in the remedial order been given a meaningful opportunity to present
evidence or be heard on the issues of the propriety of multidistrict remedy
and the existence of a constitutional violation. Earlier school desegregation
decisions by the Court were interpreted to have established merely that injured plaintiffs are entitled to be restored to the position they would have
occupied in the absence of discrimination, and that right ordinarily is to
attend a unitary school system in the district where the violation(s) occurred. 44 The Chief Justice cautioned, however, that interdistrict remedies
would be in order in future cases when constitutional violations produce
more than de minimus segregation in other districts 45 or when boundary lines
46
are deliberately drawn on the basis of race.
Mr. Justice Stewart, whose concurrence provided the deciding vote for
reversal, expanded the majority's list of illustrations by adding that interdistrict relief would also be warranted if state officials "have contributed to
the separation of the races by drawing or redrawing school district lines" 4 7
or "by purposeful, racially discriminatory use of state housing or zoning
laws."4 8 Apparently, Mr. Justice Stewart and the majority agreed that inter42. Id. at 744-45. Under this standard, a constitutional violation in more than one
district would not necessarily require an interdistrict remedy without evidence either
that such violations were substantially interrelated, or that there was a significant segregative effect in another district.
43. Id. at 744. Here, the Court employed a proposition first articulated in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971). In Swann, interestingly
enough, the same principle was used as a basis for a liberal application of equitable
powers.

44. 418 U.S. at 746.
45. Id. at 745.
46. Id.

47. 418 U.S. at 755 (Stewart, J., concurring).
48. In Milliken, as in Bradley, the Court was presented with substantial evidence
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district relief for the acts of a single governmental entity may be granted only
if the acts can be shown to be intentionally discriminatory and a substantial
cause of the racial composition of the other schools included in the remedial
order. A potentially crucial distinction between the majority's standard of
proof and that of Justice Stewart may exist where boundary manipulation is
alleged. Since the majority's opinion requires deliberate sketching of district
lines on the basis of race, plaintiffs apparently must establish discriminatory
intent by defendants, a position similar to that taken by the same four Justices in their earlier Emporia dissent. Conversely, Justice Stewart would
require only that there be disparate racial effect in order to establish racial
motive, since he indicated that interdistrict relief may be suitable when state
officials have merely advanced racial separation by sketching school district
lines.
The scope of the Milliken restrictions has since been considered by the
Court. In Evans v. Buchanan,49 the Court summarily affirmed the order of
a three-judge district court requiring the submission of interdistrict school desegregation plans for Wilmington, Delaware and its suburbs. The district
court had found that a 1968 act authorizing the State Board of Education
that housing discrimination by federal and state officials and by officials of the defendant jurisdictions effectuated the segregated housing conditions in Detroit and its suburbs.
See generally Record, vol. 2, Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); see also Taylor,
Desegregating Urban School Systems After Milliken v. Bradley, 21 WAYNE ST. L. REV
751, 765-69 (1975).
However, because the Sixth Circuit had not relied upon that
evidence to reach its decision, the Court refused to consider the housing proof. 418
U.S. at 728 n.7. Of the Justices who voted for reversal in Milliken, only Mr. Justice
Stewart felt compelled to examine the housing evidence presented by plaintiffs, and
he found the proof insufficient to demonstrate that either the racial composition of
the Detroit schools or the residential patterns within Detroit were caused by governmental activity, 418 U.S. at 756 n.2 (Stewart, J., concurring).
Commentators disagree as to whether the Court's decision to ignore the respondent's
housing proof was fatal to respondent's case. One view asserts that the housing proof
was intentionally deemphasized in appellate argument and brief by respondent's counsel
because there was little legal precedent for utilizing housing evidence in a school desegregation lawsuit. See Beer, The Nature of the Violation and the Scope of the Remedy: An Analysis of Milliken v. Bradley in Terms of the Evolution of the Theory
of the Violation, 21 WAYNE ST. L. REV. 903, 904-08 (1975); accord, 3 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 487, 490 n.13 (1975).
But see West, Another View of the Bradley Violation:
Would a Different Evolution Have Changed the Outcome?, 21 WAYNE ST. L. REV.
917 (1975).
On the other hand, at least one commentator asserts that the refusal
to consider evidence not relied upon by the appeals court is a reversal of longstanding
Supreme Court practice. See Taylor, supra, at 746 n.48.
49. 423 U.S. 963, aff'g mem., 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del. 1975). The district
court relied primarily on the decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969),
in which the Supreme Court invalidated an amendment to a city charter because it
treated racial housing matters differently from other racial and housing subjects by
making them subject to voter referendum.
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to reorganize school districts statewide but excluding the predominantly black
Wilmington school district from the reorganization was unconstitutional when
coupled with the state's history of de jure segregation. Milliken was distinguished on two grounds. First, Delaware, unlike Michigan, had a history of
state-mandated school segregation. 50 Second, evidence presented at trial in
Evans established that federal, state, and local officials had engaged in housing discrimination under guise of law. 51 Both differences were considered
to be interdistrict violations by the district court. Thus, when the court found
further that the school reorganization act had made Wilmington school desegregation more difficult, it ordered the consideration of interdistrict remedies.
In Hills v. Gautreaux, 2 a unanimous Court upheld an order by the
Seventh Circuit requiring an Illinois district court to consider metropolitan
housing relief for acts of racial discrimination by both the Chicago
Housing Authority (CHA) and the United States Department of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD). CHA was found at trial to have violated
the fourteenth amendment by perpetuating and exacerbating residential segregation in Chicago and its suburbs through its selection of tenants and sites
for public housing, 53 whereas HUD was found to have violated the fifth
amendment by funding the CHA selected housing projects, although cognizant that the projects were being selected and administered in a discriminatory fashion. 54 The district court had deemed consideration of metropolitan
relief unwarranted, but a unanimous Supreme Court disagreed. The Court
regarded Milliken as an expression of equitable principles governing the federal courts, and it restricted those courts to fashioning relief which inconvenienced only those individuals or legal entities which have been implicated in the constitutional violation.-5 Since CHA and HUD both had been
found guilty of constitutional violations metropolitan in scope, consideration
of metropolitan relief was not only proper, but necessary.1 6 From the lan50. 393 F. Supp. at 432.
51. Id. at 434-35.
52. 425 U.S. 284 (1976).
53. Id. at 287-88. CHA had engaged in a consistent practice of seeking approval for
proposed sites from the alderman in whose ward the site was located. Any site vetoed
by the alderman was withdrawn from further consideration by CHA. This policy had
resulted in rejection of 99% of the units proposed for white areas.
54. Id. at 289.
55. Id. at 293-94. Mr. Justice Stewart went on to write that "[nlothing in the Milliken decision suggests a per se rule that federal courts lack authority to order parties
found to have violated the Constitution to undertake remedial efforts beyond the municipal boundaries of the city where the violation occurred." Id. at 298.
56. Id. at 297.
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guage of the opinion and from the facts of the case, however, it is clear that
the Justices did not consider Gautreaux to be an interdistrict case, because
HUD's authorization to operate throughout the Chicago metropolitan area
housing market made the metropolitan area a single entity for purposes of

determining relief.5 7 Furthermore, the Court expressly rejected the proposition that location of public housing close to heavily black census tracts constituted evidence of suburban discrimination justifying interdistrict relief. 58
The Supreme Court's affirmance of the district court decision in Evans v.
Buchanan makes it clear that Milliken did not entirely prohibit interdistrict
remedies. It further suggests that under Gautreaux, a multidistrict action
may, under appropriate circumstances, be amenable to single-district principles and analysis.5 9 The absence of a majority opinion in Evans, however,
coupled with the ease by which Gautreaux lends itself to single-district
analysis, left unanswered several questions posed by the Milliken decision.
The principal issues still facing the federal courts were whether particular
acts of de jure segregation require interdistrict remedies and whether the
same reasoning employed in earlier decisions may be used in the multidistrict setting.
B.

The Intent Cases

School Commissioners was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court
in light of two recent decisions focusing on the evidentiary showing necessary
to demonstrate intent to discriminate, Washington v. Davis60 and Village
of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp.61 In
Washington, decided before the Seventh Circuit's decision in School Commissioners,62 the Supreme Court held that a written entrance examination given
57. HUD could construct federal government housing in the metropolitan area without the approval of the local governments. Id. at 304 n.21.
58. Id. Ultimately, the import of this rejection may be insignificant since the Court
recognized that the evidence was being offered merely to show the scarcity of integrated
public housing in the Chicago metropolitan area and not to show discriminatory motive.
59. Apparently neither Evans nor Gautreaux mandate the imposition of interdistrict
remedies for interdistrict violations, since the point was not addressed by the district
court in Evans, and Gautreaux was arguably not an instance of interdistrict violation.
The Court thereby seems to have left the question of interdistrict relief to the discretion
of the federal courts, with the proviso that such remedies must be considered when
interdistrict violations are found. Evans and Gautreaux also are silent on the issue
of whether an interdistrict violation may be established in a school desegregation suit
by the adduction of evidence of housing discrimination.

60. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
61. 429 U.S. 252 (1977).
62. Washington was discussed extensively in the School Commissioners dissent. See
note 25 supra.
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to all applicants for the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department
was not racially discriminatory even though it excluded blacks at a disproportionately higher rate than whites. The court declared that statistically disproportionate racial impact alone does not establish purpose or intent to
segregate, an essential element of de jure segregation.6 Although the Court
recognized that invidious discriminatory purpose may often be inferred from
the particular facts, including disparate racial effect, it denied that it previously had determined "that a law, neutral on its face and serving ends otherwise within the power of goverment to pursue, is invalid under the Equal
Protection Clause simply because it may affect a greater proportion of one
race than of another. ' '64 In a moment of judicial understatement, the Court
conceded that other of its cases contain language to the contrary. 65 Emporia
was specifically cited as one such decision. 66 The Court, however, distinguished that case by noting that it, unlike Washington, involved an unremedied constitutional violation. While the Court did not directly address those
portions of the Emporia opinion which rejected as irrelevant for a finding
of de jure segregation an investigation into the dominant purpose behind state
action, in order to reconcile the Emporia and Washington decisions the Court
must have accepted as proper the utilization of the effects test when there
is preexisting de jure segregation. However, it must have rejected that
approach when the alleged discrimination was unaccompanied by an antecedent constitutional violation.
In Arlington Heights, the Court expressly affirmed its holding in Washington that official action is not unconstitutional solely because it has a racially
disparate impact. 67

Because it was found that the plaintiffs had adduced

insufficient evidence to demonstrate that officials of the predominantly
white village were motivated by racial considerations, the Court determined
that the officials had not engaged in racial discrimination by refusing to grant
a zoning change which would have allowed the construction of integrated low63. The Court quoted language from Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189,
205, 208 (1973) in support of this proposition. In Keyes, however, the Court was
willing to infer that racial disparity in the schools located in one portion of a school
district was the result of de jure segregation when such segregation had been proven
in another portion of the same district. While that inference is technically not inconsistent with the holding of Washington, it does present another instance where the
Court has utilized an initially expansive principle in a restrictive fashion. See also
note 43 supra.
64. 426 U.S. at 242.
65. Id.

66. Id. at 243.
67. 429 U.S. at 264-65.
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and moderate-income housing. The Court did clarify its language in
Washington, however, by stating that judicial deference to the decision
making process would not be in order when there was proof that a decision
by a legislature or administrative body had been motivated by "a discriminatory purpose."6 8 Recognizing that few situations exist in which there is overt
evidence of discrimination in the decision-making process, the Court identified sources of inquiry to pursue in determining whether legislative or administrative action is racially discriminatory. Among the sources mentioned were the historical background of the decision, the sequence of events
leading to the decision-especially if the succession of events deviate
from the norm or are taken in a manner that clearly implies that they were
racially motivated-and the legislative or administrative history of the
decision.69
As a result of Washington and Arlington Heights, civil rights plaintiffs must
now affirmatively demonstrate that invidious racial purpose, rather than disparate racial effect, accompanies official action. It appears, however, that
a demonstration of disparate racial impact alone will be sufficient to shift the
burden of proof to the defendant when state action which produces racial
disparity is preceded by official racial discrimination.
III.

SCHOOL COMMISSIONERS:

Milliken CONSTRUED

The operative facts in School Commissioners were found by the Seventh
Circuit to be similar in kind to those in Evans.70 In both cases, state senates
enacted legislation which excluded school systems with large black popula-

tions from schemes which likely would have facilitated school desegregation.
Relying principally on the reasoning of Evans, the Seventh Circuit ruled this
exclusion unconstitutional because it made desegregation of Indianapolis pub-

lic schools more difficult to achieve than other goals satisfied by consolidation. Since School Commissioners was factually analogous to Evans, which
established that suspect racial classifications may be created when statutes not
68. Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added). The Court's language implies that even if racial
concerns instigate legislative or administrative action less than do other factors, any evidence of racial motivation in such action is sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the
defendants.
69. Id. at 267-68. The legislation in School Commissioners, which enabled consolidation to proceed without including the respective school systems, might come within
the Arlington Heights proscriptions since previous municipal consolidation in Indiana
had to include the respective school systems. At odds with that conclusion is the Seventh Circuit's failure to find any racial motivation behind the passage of that combination of legislation. See 541 F.2d at 1220-21.
70. 541 F.2d at 1222.
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explicitly addressing racial matters have a pronounced racial effect, 71 the
Seventh Circuit concluded that the Uni-Gov legislation's effective preclusion
72
of interdistrict desegregation demanded a limited interdistrict remedy.
The Seventh Circuit also found other support for its decision to provide
interdistrict relief. As in Keyes, acts of de jure segregation by the defendants
73
imposed the duty on the state to desegregate the schools of Indianapolis.
As in Gautreaux,the Indianapolis housing authority was empowered to locate
public housing outside Indianapolis without voter approval but had chosen
not to exercise that power.7 4 Also, the defendant suburban jurisdictions had
been given the option to accept low income housing for families but had
rejected all such proposals. 75 Finally, the court found that the suburban governments had made non-inclusion of the schools in the Uni-Gov plan politically expedient. 76 The court perceived the combination of these actions and
the creation of Uni-Gov to be interdistrict violations under Milliken because
they exhibited deliberate redrawing of school district lines, purposeful racially
discriminatory use of state housing laws, and involvement of the suburban
jurisdictions in the effort to discriminate. These offenses, concluded the
court, contributed to the separation of the races and had significant segregative impact on the pupil composition of other Marion County school districts.
Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's remedial order.
The Supreme Court's subsequent vacation of the School Commissioners case
and a closer examination of the Seventh Circuit's opinion, however, suggest
that the imposition of interdistrict relief may be inappropriate.
In the first place, the context in which consolidation presented a violation
in School Commissioners is not exactly the same as that present in Evans.
In Evans there had been antecedent statewide segregation in the public
schools created by state statutes. There also had been cooperation between
Wilmington and its suburbs to maintain and increase that segregation in the
Wilmington schools and a history of discriminatory public housing policies
practiced in the Wilmington metropolitan area.7 7 Under the Milliken stand71. 393 F. Supp. at 441.
72. 541 F.2d at 1222. Uni-Gov is explained in note 20 supra.

73. A 1949 act passed by the Indiana General Assembly requiring phased-in desegregation ended Indiana's official policy of segregation. 1949 Ind. Acts, ch. 186, p.603.
74. 541 F.2d at 1216-17.
75. Id. at 1216. This option ended with the creation of Uni-Gov in 1969. Before
that date all but one of the public housing projects had been built. Since 1969, authority
to construct public housing throughout Marion County has rested with the Indianapolis
Housing Authority.
76. Id. at 1221.
77. 393 F. Supp. at 433-37.
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ards both the statutory de jure segregation and the efforts by the governments
of Wilmington and its suburbs to maintain segregation would be interdistrict
violations. 78 Thus, in Evans, a condition of unremedied interdistrict segregation was present prior to statewide school reorganization since the state of
Delaware had not completed the desegregation of the Wilmington school
district. School reorganization excluding Wilmington and thereby foreclosing interdistrict desegregation of the Wilmington school system was
therefore a further abdication by the state of its duty to desegregate the Wilmington schools.
In School Commissioners, on the other hand, the segregative acts of the
State and the School Commission before consolidation were confined to
Indianapolis and there was no history of state-wide de jure segregation, although there was evidence of private and official discrimination in the sale
of housing as well as evidence of official discrimination in the location of public housing. Yet, it is arguable that these two categories of housing violations
cited by the district court were not constitutional violations at all. The first,
suburban refusal to accept public housing, was not deemed a violation by the
Fourth Circuit in Bradley79 and expressly was not considered by the Supreme
Court in Milliken.80 The second, failure of the housing authority to build
public housing outside Indianapolis, would not likely be deemed "significant"
by the Supreme Court since approval by the suburban jurisdictions was required during the selection of ten of the eleven project sites."' Hence, it
must primarily be the creation of Uni-Gov alone that transforms the otherwise intradistrict violations into an interdistrict violation.8 2
The absence of a Supreme Court opinion in Evans, however, left unanswered the question of whether school reorganization, in and of itselfj was
an interdistrict violation or whether it was only an interdistrict violation when
found in conjunction with other interdistrict violations. Whether consolida78. The Supreme Court did not consider the housing issue in Milliken. See 418
U.S. at 728 n.7.
79. Bradley v. School Bd., 462 F.2d 1058 (4th Cir. 1972), alf'd sub nom. School
Bd. v. State Bd. of Educ., 412 U.S. 92 (1973). See notes 36-40 supra & accompanying
text.
80. 418 U.S. at 728 n.7.
81. Only one public housing project was erected after 1969. Before that time each
jurisdiction within Marion County could veto public housing.
82. Furthermore, the Seventh Circuit tacitly rejected the idea that acts before the
creation of Uni-Gov established an interdistrict violation since the court remanded the
case after reviewing the district court's order for interdistrict relief to have the district
court also determine if consolidation was an interdistrict violation. Had sufficient evidence been adduced to establish an interdistrict violation, there would have been no
need for remand.
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tion could transform an otherwise intradistrict offense into an interdistrict one
is, therefore, an untested proposition. The School Commissioners case may
have answered that question affirmatively by treating the general assembly's
conduct in facilitating school system exclusion from Marion County consolidation as forestalling interdistrict desegregation of Indianapolis schools. If,
as this casenote has suggested, there was no substantial interdistrict violation
preceding the creation of Uni-Gov, then consolidation alone has converted
School Commissionersfrom an intradistrict case into an interdistrict one. Assuming arguendo that this reasoning would be acceptable to a majority of the
Supreme Court, the remedy imposed for the constitutional violations would
still seem unjustified.
In Milliken, the Supreme Court indicated that those injured by unlawful
discrimination are to be returned to the status they would have attained absent the discrimination. In School Commissioners that principle apparently
would dictate that the consolidation be voided and that the plaintiffs be returned to the status they would have occupied had there been no consolidation. Indianapolis school children, therefore, should be allowed to attend
unitary schools in Indianapolis, and that result should not be altered simply
because the district court found that intradistrict relief would be ineffective.
Remand by the Supreme Court undoubtedly will force the Seventh Circuit
to reassess its School Commissioners decision. An obvious conclusion for the
court to draw is that it must decide whether the consolidation legislation was
racially motivated under the standards enunciated in Washington and Arlington Heights. The Supreme Court might also intend that the other violations
found by the Seventh Circuit be examined for racial purpose. To properly
pursue these inquiries the Seventh Circuit may need to remand the case to
the district court for further evidentiary hearings. Examination of legislative
intent by the circuit court, however, would seem to be secondary to a determination of whether there was interdistrict discrimination prior to consolidation. With a foundation of preexisting interdistrict discrimination, the evidence that segregation has increased since consolidation would mandate an
interdistrict remedy. On the other hand, a finding that there previously was
only intradistrict segregation in Indianapolis, coupled with the district court's
prior determination that consolidation was not racially motivated, would confine the issue in School Commissioners to a determination of whether interdistrict relief may be granted for an act which has interdistrict effects yet
lacks racially invidious purpose.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The broad powers of federal courts to remedy de jure school segregation
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were circumscribed by Milliken v. Bradley, which required a greater demonstration of discrimination to effect multidistrict remedies. However, subsequent action by the Court in Evans and Gautreaux indicated that Milliken
does not proscribe all interdistrict relief. The peculiarities of those two
decisions, however, left undefined the extent of the Milliken restrictions.
The Court recently compounded the confusion in Washington and Arlington
Heights by rejecting an effects test as the proper means of determining invidious purpose when previous de jure discrimination is absent.
The case of United States v. Board of School Commissioners demonstrates
both that the effects test of Emporia still applies in appropriate circumstances
and that housing remedies may be afforded for school desegregation. Although the court's command that a limited interdistrict remedy be utilized
when intradistrict relief proves ineffective may not withstand judicial scrutiny,
the court's treatment of the issues of intent and the relationship between
housing discrimination and public school segregation may serve as guideposts
in future civil rights litigation.

Gerald 1. Fisher

CRIMINAL LAW-Because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act is the Exclusive Method for Transfer of Prisoners
Between Jurisdictions for Trial, a Federal Writ of Habeas

Corpus Ad Prosequendum is Equivalent to a Detainer. United
States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976).
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act1 provides a procedure by
which a jurisdiction with charges outstanding against a prisoner in another
jurisdiction may obtain temporary custody of that prisoner for purposes of
prosecution. 2 The Agreement requires that any jurisdiction employing its
procedures comply with certain time limitations in bringing the prisoner to
trial or suffer dismissal of the charges underlying the detainer. 3 When it
enacted the Agreement in 1970, Congress did not consider the effect of the
Agreement on the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, the method tra1. 18 U.S.C. app. (1970).
2. The Agreement also provides a procedure by which a prisoner can clear charges
against himself on which a detainer is based. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. III (1970).
3. Id. § 2, art. V(c).
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ditionally employed by federal prosecutors to obtain temporary custody of
state prisoners. 4 In United States v. Mauro,5 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the federal writ is the equivalent of
a detainer filed pursuant to the Agreement, and thus the procedures of the
Agreement must be followed when the writ is used. 6
The question of a possible conflict between the Agreement and the writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum in Mauro arose out of an indictment
issued by the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of New York
against two prisoners incarcerated in New York prisons. Writs of habeas
corpus ad prosequendum were issued to the wardens of the institutions directing them to bring the prisoners before the court. Following their arraignment, the defendants were returned to state custody while new writs for their
trials were being issued. Prior to their return to federal court, however, both
defendants moved for dismissal of their indictments on the ground that the
United States had violated section 2, article IV(e) 7 of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, which provides that if a jurisdiction with temporary
custody of a prisoner pursuant to the Agreement returns that prisoner to the
jurisdiction of his original incarceration without trial, the charges on which
the prosecution is based must be dismissed. The same judge who had
ordered the return to state custody granted the motions to dismiss,8 and the
government appeals were consolidated before the court of appeals. 9
Speaking for the Mauro majority, Judge Mulligan rejected outright the government's argument that since detainers had not been filed in obtaining
custody of the defendants, the terms of the Agreement, and particularly its
4. The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is issuable by the federal courts
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(5) (1970). This writ has been characterized as the
"traditional and time-honored method employed by federal courts to obtain state prisoners for trial." United States v. Mauro, 544 F.2d 588, 591 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. granted,
46 U.S.L.W. 3183, No. 76-1596 (Oct. 3, 1977). See also United States v. Ford, 550
F.2d 732 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 46 U.S.L.W. 3183, No. 77-52 (Oct. 3, 1977)
(per J. Mansfield, following Mauro, a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum used for
transfer of custody after filing a detainer is a request for custody for purposes of the
Agreement).
5. 544 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1976).
6. Id. at 592.
7. If trial is not had on any indictment, information, or complaint contemplated
hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of imprisonment pursuant to article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information, or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter an
order dismissing the same with prejudice.
18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(e) (1970), quoted in Mauro, 544 F.2d at 591.
8. United States v. Mauro, 414 F. Supp. 358 (E.D.N.Y. 1976).
9. 544 F.2d at 589.
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sanctions for noncompliance, did not apply. 10 Referring to the admittedly
sparse" legislative history of the Agreement, 12 the court noted that the policy
considerations supporting its enactment applied equally to detainers and to
writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum."3 Permitting the United States to
avoid the procedures and sanctions of the Agreement merely by using a writ
of habeas corpus, argued the court, would eviscerate the purpose and intent
of the Agreement. 14 The court rejected the argument that in view of the
availability of the writ of habeas corpus to federal prosecutors, the Agreement was intended only to remedy problems which the states had in procuring federal prisoners.' 5 The court affirmed the dismissal of the indictments by holding that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a detainer
for purposes of the Agreement.' 6
In a vigorous dissent, Judge Mansfield argued against equating the writ
with a detainer. 1 7 He noted that the Agreement allows the governor of a
sending state the discretion to refuse to honor a detainer, 18 whereas the writ
of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is couched in mandatory language, and
would be enforceable against a recalcitrant state under the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution.19 Further, Judge Mansfield argued, the
10. Id. at 591-92.
11. Id. at 590. The court understated the situation remarkably well by noting that
the legislative history is not "particularly enlightening." Id.
12. See S. REP. No. 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), 116 CONG. REc. 13999
(1970) and 116 CONG. REc. 38840 (1970).
13. 544 F.2d at 591-92.
14. Id. at 594-95.
15. The court argued that such a holding would require repealing those portions
of the Agreement which clearly apply to the United States as a receiving jurisdiction.

Id. at 593-94. The court further stated that its action did not amount to repeal of
the habeas corpus statute since Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi and Oklahoma were not
parties to the Agreement, and thus the writ was still needed for those states. Id. at
594. The legislative history of the Agreement, however, clearly contemplated that all
of the states would shortly join in the Agreement. See 116 CONG. REc. 38841 (1970).
16. 544 F.2d at 592. "We conclude that the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
is a detainer entitling the state inmate to the protection provided in Article IV
[of the Agreement] and specifically to a trial before his return to the state institution."
Id. (footnotes omitted).
17. Id. at 595.
18. Id. at 597. The Agreement provides that within 30 days of receiving a request
for transfer of custody of a prisoner, the governor may disapprove the request, "either
upon his own motion or upon motion of the prisoner." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IV(a)
(1970).

19. 544 F.2d at 595-96. The language of the writ appears to be mandatory in effect.
It is directed to whomever has custody of the prisoner, and begins with the words
"[y]ou are hereby commanded." It is arguable that this is merely an archaic form and
connotes nothing of substance. See Annot., 5 L. Ed.2d 964, 966-68 (1961); see generally, R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (1969).
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writ subverts neither the intent of the Agreement to mitigate the adverse effects of detainers on prisoners, 20 nor the purpose of the Agreement to provide
the states with an adequate method for gaining temporary custody of federal
prisoners. 2 1 Judge Mansfield concluded that detainers and writs of habeas
corpus serve distinct and separate purposes without conflict, and that the
majority's decision served to judicially repeal a time-honored federal proce22
dure.
I.

FEDERAL ACCESS TO STATE PRISONERS FOR
PURPOSES OF PROSECUTION

Prior to enactment of the Agreement, state prisoners were available to
federal prosecutors for trial through the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum. Although the origins of the writ of habeas corpus are lost
in antiquity, 23 the federal judiciary has been empowered to issue the writ
since the signing of the Constitution. 24 In Ex parte Bollman,25 Chief Justice
Marshall discussed both the common law and statutory bases for issuance of
writs of habeas corpus by the federal courts. 26 Noting that the term habeas
corpus is generic, encompassing several species, including the "Great Writ"
ad subjiciendum,27 he proceeded to analyze section 14 of the Judiciary Act
of 178928 to determine whether the Supreme Court was empowered to issue
the writ, and if so, the nature and scope of the writ as applied to prisoners.
Finding that the Act did empower the Court to issue the writ, 29 Chief Justice
Marshall noted that its applicability to prisoners was limited to those already
20. 544 F.2d at 596-97. Because the writ is executed immediately and does not
remain outstanding against a prisoner, Judge Mansfield argued, it does not hinder the
prisoner's preparation of a defense, nor does it result in any loss of privileges. Id.
21. Id. at 597.
22. Id.

23. For a general discussion of the history and evolution of habeas corpus, see R.
(1969). The writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum
is discussed in particular at § 4.5.

SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS

24. "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless

when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
art. I, § 9 cl. 2.

U.S. CoNS'r.

See also Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

25. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).
26. Id. at 93-101. Chief Justice Marshall noted that while we look to the common
law for the meaning of habeas corpus, the power to issue the writ must be found in
written law. Id. at 93-94.
27. Id. at 95. This is the writ guaranteed by the Constitution. See note 24 supra.
It permits the court to examine the legality of custody. BLACK'S LAw DIcIoNARY
837 (4th ed. 1968).
28. Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).

29. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 94.
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in federal custody or those needed to testify before a federal court.3 0 The
Chief Justice arrived at this conclusion following a discussion of the varieties
of the writ of habeas corpus in the context of an interpretation of the Act,
rejected by the Court, which would have severely limited the applicability
of the writ to prisoners.3 1 It is noteworthy that Bollman is often cited as
authority for the proposition that federal courts cannot compel production of
a state prisoner for trial on federal charges by a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum.32 This reading of the case is apparently derived from language in the Court's discussion of the various auxiliary writs, 3 and it appears
to have gone unnoticed that this issue was never actually before the Court
in Boliman.a4 The prisoners were already in federal custody, under commitment for trial before a lower federal court, and thus, language used in discussing a particular variety of the writ issued in England in certain civil cases
would appear to be neither relevant to the issue before the Court nor authoritative on the issue of federal power over state prisoners. 35 Further, as noted
above, the Court's discussion of the varieties of the writ, other than the writ
ad subjiciendum, was made in the context of analyzing a much narrower construction of the statute than was ultimately adopted. 36 It is also interesting
to note that under the Court's reasoning on the limitations of the applicability
of the writ to prisoners, state prisoners could be brought into federal court
to testify by the writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum, which issues for a
30. Id. at 99-101.
as follows:

The limiting language of the original habeas corpus act read

Provided, That writs of habeas corpus shall in no case extend to prisoners
in gaol, unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority
of the United States, or are committed for trial before some court of the
same, or are necessary to be brought into court to testify. 1 Stat. 82 (1789).
Judiciary Act, ch. 20, § 4, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
31. 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 97-99.
32. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Moses v. Kipp, 232 F.2d 147 (7th Cir. 1956);
Lunsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1942).
33. The state courts are not, in any sense of the word, inferior courts, except in
the particular cases in which an appeal lies from their judgment to this court;
and in these cases the mode of proceeding is particularly prescribed, and is not
by habeas corpus. They are not inferior courts because they emanate from a
different authority, and are the creatures of a distinct government.
8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 97.
34. The prisoners were already in federal custody on charges of treason against the
United States. Id. at 75.
35. The Court was discussing the writ ad respondendum which was used "when a
man hath a cause of action against one who is confined by the process of some inferior
court; in order to remove the prisoner and charge him with this new action in the
court above." 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 97 (emphasis added).
36. Id. at 99.
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prisoner whenever he is " 'necessary to be brought into court to testify.' ,,37
Thus, any disability of the federal courts in issuing writs of habeas corpus
for state prisoners must be of statutory, rather than constitutional, dimensions.
This interpretation is borne out in dicta of Ex parte Dorr,38 which involved
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum on behalf of a state
prisoner convicted of high treason against the state of Rhode Island. Interpreting the same proviso limiting habeas corpus for prisoners as did the Court
in Bollman, the Dorr Court held that the writ would not issue for a state
prisoner except when necessary to bring him into court to testify.3 9 The holding in Dorr was legislatively overruled by the Habeas Corpus Act of 186740
which empowered the federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to inquire
into the legality of a state prisoner's confinement under the Constitution and
laws of the United States. 41 It would appear that the final bar to issuance
of a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum for state prisoners was removed
in 1948 when the habeas corpus statutes were revised. The words "or for
trial" were added to the provision permitting issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus ad testificandum, thus empowering the issuance of the writ ad
42
prosequendum for state prisoners.
Despite the apparent availability of the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum to the federal courts to obtain custody of state prisoners, the
courts have principally relied on Bollman, Dorr, and one other case, similarly
inapposite, for the proposition that federal courts cannot interfere with state
custody of prisoners. In Ponzi v. Fessenden,43 the Supreme Court was faced
37. Id. (quoting Judiciary Act ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73 (1789)). The proviso restricting the use of habeas corpus for prisoners had three exceptions, two limited to
federal prisoners and one apparently not so qualified, which is the writ ad testijicandum.
See note 30 supra.
38. 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845). Dorr is often cited with Bollman as limiting
federal interference with the states. See note 32 supra.

39. 44 U.S. (3 How.) at 105. "Neither this nor any other court of the United
States, or judge thereof, can issue a habeas corpus to bring up a prisoner who is in
custody under a sentence or execution of a state court, for any other purpose than
to be used as a witness." Id.
40. 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
41. The Act is now codified as 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (c) (3) (1970).
42. The addition of the words appears to have escaped without comment. See Longs.
dorf, The Federal Habeas Corpus Acts Original and Amended, 13 F.R.D. 407, 416

(1953).

The plain meaning of the exception to the proviso is that both writs ad testifi-

candum and ad prosequendum issue under the same terms and conditions.

Clearly,

the ad prosequendum writ now extends to state prisoners, because "[tlhere is a presumption against construing a statute as containing superfluous or meaningless words

or giving it a construction that would render it ineffective."
397 F.2d 203, 207 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968) (footnotes omitted).
43. 258 U.S. 254 (1922).

United States v. Blasius,
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with a challenge by a federal prisoner of his temporary transfer to state custody for trial and his subsequent return to federal prison. Chief Justice Taft,
in holding that the United States could consent to such a transfer and that
it worked no prejudice on the prisoner, 44 stated the essence of the rule of
comity: because there often exists concurrent jurisdiction over persons and
things in the state and federal systems, the situation requires a "spirit of reciprocal comity and mutual assistance to promote due and orderly procedure."' 45 Thus, in the interest of friendly federal-state relations, Ponzi stands
for the proposition that the governments should cooperate in the enforcement
of their laws, and that such cooperation does not affect the rights of any
prisoner subject to it.46
One final issue, infrequently addressed by the courts in this context, is the
relationship between the rule of comity and the supremacy clause of the Federal Constitution. 47 During the late 1800's, several cases which placed in
issue the status of state interference in the operation of federal law and
judicial process reached the Supreme Court. Although many of the cases
arose under the Habeas Corpus Act of 186748 and were concerned with the
new federal power to inquire into the legality of state confinement, 49 the unmistakable tenor of the decisions was that the judicial power of the United
States was within the ambit of the supremacy clause. 50 Thus, in cases of
conflict between federal and state authority, at least where direct interference
with the operation of federal law or process results, the former should prevail. 51
44. Id. at 261-62, 266.

45. Id. at 259.
46. Id. at 265-66. It is interesting to note that Ponzi and the cases just discussed
are frequently cited for the proposition that comity will prevent the compelled exercise
of federal jurisdiction over state prisoners. E.g., Lunsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653,
655 (10th Cir. 1942).
47. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl.2.

48. 14 Stat. 385 (1867).
49. See, e.g., Ex parte Royall,,117 U.S. 241 (1886).
50. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858).
.51. See Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 397 (1871).
Such being the distinct and independent character of the two governments,

within their respective spheres of action, it follows that neither can intrude
with its judicial process into the domain of the other, except so far as such
intrusion may be necessary on the part of the National government to preserve
its rightful supremacy in cases of conflict of authority.
Id. at 407.
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The Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act 5 2 does not clarify the issue of
the balance between federal and state authority to obtain temporary custody
of the other's prisoners for purposes of prosecution. Despite the clear impact
of the Agreement on federal-state relations and the administration of criminal
justice, the legislative history is, to say the least, sparse and is confined solely
to the latter consideration. 53 The Senate Report 54 sets forth two reasons
favoring enactment of the Agreement: first, to afford prisoners their speedy
55
trial right, thereby preventing the reversal of cases for its denial, and second,
to provide prisoners more certainty as to their future and prison authorities

the means to plan more effectively for rehabilitation. 56 Beyond relatively
brief statements of the desirability of federal participation in the Agreement
based on these considerations, the record is silent on the writ of habeas corpus
ad prosequendum.
The Agreement was clearly intended to provide cooperative procedures for
the states and the federal government to obtain temporary custody of each
other's prisoners for prosecution. 57 The Agreement was enacted in response
to constitutional and procedural problems which had developed in the de5
The constitainer system employed by both federal and state prosecutors.
tutional impetus for the Agreement was the development of the speedy trial
right59 for federal and state prisoners with charges pending against them in
60
Although the
jurisdictions other than that in which they were incarcerated.
Agreement implements aspects of the speedy trial right as between the
prisoner and the indicting jurisdiction, there is as yet no remedy under either
the Agreement or the sixth amendment if the imprisoning jurisdiction does
52. 18 U.S.C. app. (1970).
53. See note 12 supra.
54. S. REP. No. 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
55. Id.
56. Id. The Agreement also allows prosecutors to obtain prisoners for trial before
their sentences expire and while witnesses are available. Id.
57. Congress empowered the states to enter into cooperative compacts for the prevention of crime and the enforcement of their criminal laws in 1934, in what is now
codified as 4 U.S.C. § 112(a) (1970).
58. See S. REP. No. 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970).
59. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
60. S. REP. No. 91-1356, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). In Smith v. Hooey, 393
U.S. 374 (1969), the Supreme Court imposed a constitutional duty on an indicting
jurisdiction to make a diligent, good faith effort to obtain temporary custody of a prisoner in another jurisdiction for prosecution. In Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972),
the Supreme Court enunciated a balancing test composed of four factors for evaluating
speedy trial claims: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's
assertion of the right, and prejudice to the defendant. 407 U.S. at 530. The Court
has not addressed how the speedy trial test would be affected if the defendant were
imprisoned in a foreign jurisdiction.
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The procedural problems

concerned prisoner morale and rehabilitation traditionally associated with de-

tainers outstanding against prisoners. 62 A prisoner with an outstanding
detainer would often be held in close custody, ineligible for trustee status,
prison work programs, or work release programs, and less likely to be

paroled.6 3 The uncertainty engendered by the detainer was also often reflected in the prisoner's attitude toward any programs which were available
to him.

64

The Agreement, with certain limitations, 5 operates to mitigate these adverse effects by providing procedures whereby an indicting state can obtain
custody of a prisoner in another jurisdiction, while requiring that the prisoner
be notified of detainers and allowed to demand disposition of the underlying
charges.66 In either case, the Agreement imposes time limits within which
61. In May v. Georgia, 409 F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1969), however, the court indicated
that some action may be taken against the imprisoning jurisdiction if its actions threatened speedy trial rights of its prisoner. The court stated that should the imprisoning
state refuse to deliver a prisoner to the indicting state, "the federal courts would be
open to test the rightfulness of such action since it would tend to interfere with
[the prisoner's] Sixth Amendment rights." id. at 205 n.5. See also Note, Extending
the Smith v. Hooey Duty to the Holding Jurisdiction, 23 ME. L. REV. 201 (1971).
However, the courts have generally found delay justified because the prisoner assisted
or acquiesced in it, or was not prejudiced by it. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson,
508 F.2d 1001 (7th Cir. 1975); United States v. Perez, 489 F.2d 51 (5th Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 945 (1974); United States v. Jones, 475 F.2d 322 (D.C. Ci,'.
1972).
Even if the facts of the case will not justify application of the Barker speedy trial
balancing test, supra note 60, the due process right to a fair trial may nonetheless require dismissal of the charges. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
For more in-depth treatment of the speedy trial rights of prisoners, see Walther, Detainer Warrants and the Speedy Trial Provision, 46 MARQ. L. REV. 423 (1963); Com-

ment, The Detainer System and the Right to a Speedy Trial, 31 U. CHI. L. REv. 535
(1964); Note, The Interstate Criminal Detainer and the Sixth Amendment, 23 ARK. L.
REV. 634 (1970); Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer
Statutes, 18 RUTGERS L. REV. 828, 835 (1964).
62. See, e.g., Note, Convicts-The Right to a Speedy Trial and the New Detainer

Statutes, 18 RuTERs L. REV. 828 (1964).
63. Id. at 835-36.
64. Id. at 836. It has been estimated that as many as 50% of all detainers filed
were never acted on. Id. at 835 n.59.
65. The Agreement operates only on untried charges based on indictments, informations and complaints. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. 1,111, IV (1970). Detainers, however,
have often been filed merely because the prisoner is wanted for questioning, or just
to harass the prisoner.

See Note, The Interstate Criminal Detainer and the Sixth

Amendment, 23 AiK. L. REV. 634, 635 (1970). The Agreement has not been enacted
by, and is thus inapplicable to, Alabama, Alaska, Mississippi and Oklahoma. See note
15 supra.

66. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, arts. III, IV (1970).
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the prisoner must be tried after his arrival in the indicting jurisdiction. 67 In
addition, the prisoner cannot be returned to the state of his original imprisonment without first being tried on the charges on which the detainer was
based. 68 Failure to comply with any of these restrictions results in dismissal
of the charges with prejudice. 69
The federal cases which have considered the relationship of the writ of
habeas corpus ad prosequendum and the Agreement since the latter's enactment have done nothing to resolve the problems discussed above.70 In
United States v. Ricketson 7" the defendant was confined in an Illinois prison
when he was indicted by federal authorities. On three separate occasions
prior to the filing of a detainer with the state authorities, the defendant was
transferred to the federal district court for proceedings and then returned to
state custody. 72 The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the basis
of article 111(d) of the Agreement. 73 The Seventh Circuit, however, held that
since all of the transfers occurred prior to the filing of the detainer, the
Agreement was inapplicable.7 4 Although the court was not explicit in this
regard, it apparently considered the threshold question to be whether a detainer had been filed and reasoned that anything occurring prior to such filing could not be governed by the Agreement. 75 The court did not discuss
what constituted a detainer.
While Ricketson dealt with federal writs issued prior to the filing of a
detainer, United States ex rel. Esola v. Groomes76 dealt with state writs issued
without filing a detainer. In Esola, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit expressly declined to follow the reasoning of Ricketson. 77 While in federal prison, the defendant was transferred on at least four separate occasions
to the state court and returned to federal prison. At least one of these trans67. These limits are 120 days when the transfer is initiated by the state, Id. § 2, art.
IV(c); and 180 days when the transfer is initiated by the prisoner. Id. § 2, art. 111(a).
68. Id. § 2, arts. 111(d), IV(e).
69. Id. § 2, art. V(c).
70. The state cases that have faced the issue generally follow the federal cases. See,
e.g., Hoss v. State, 266 Md. 136, 292 A.2d 48 (1972).
71. 498 F.2d 367 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 965 (1974).
72. 498 F.2d at 373. The detainer was filed on August 22, 1972; the transfers occurred in March, May and July, 1972, for arraignment, pre-trial motions and a deposition. Id. at 372-73.
73. Id.
74. 498 F.2d at 373.
75. Id. The court indicated that it was willing to treat the writs as requests for
custody under the Agreement, but gave no indication that it considered the writ the
equivalent of a detainer.
76. 520 F.2d 830 (3rd Cir. 1975).
77. Id. at 838 n.23.
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fers was effected by a state writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum, and it
appeared from the court's discussion of the government's arguments that no
detainer had ever been filed with the federal authorities. 78 The basis of the
defendant's appeal was the same as that in Ricketson-his return to the
original incarcerating jurisdiction without trial. Although discussing detainers in another context,79 but without discussing any similarities or differences in form or substance between detainers and writs of habeas corpus
the court stated that to permit multiple transfers would render the Agreement
meaningless, because its sanctions could then be circumvented by the writ.
The court held that whenever the Agreement was available, it was the
exclusive means for effecting a transfer.80
In United States v. Sorrell,"x the District Court for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania ignored the possibility of an easy reconciliation with Ricketson
and elected instead to follow the Esola reasoning. Sorrell involved transfers
of a state prisoner by writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum after the filing of a detainer, which were precisely the circumstances in which Ricketson
indicated that the writ might be treated as a request for custody under the
Agreement.8 2 Nonetheless, citing Esola as authority, and briefly discussing
the policies supporting the Agreement, the Sorrell court held that the Agreement was the exclusive means of transfer for prosecution when it was available813 and did not discuss the relationship between the writ and detainers.
II.

Mauro

AND STATE INTERFERENCE WITH

FEDERAL PROSECUTIONS

The Mauro court gave short shrift to prior case and statutory law. Apparently following the lead of the Esola and Sorrell cases, it examined the purposes and policies supporting the Agreement and ruled so as to futher those
policies. Although Mauro will certainly further the rehabilitative, morale,
and speedy trial considerations of the Agreement,8 4 its ruling that detainers
and writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum are equivalent may not have
78. Id. at 832, 836.
79. The court was addressing the question whether a detainer could be filed when

the accused was on bail from the requesting jurisdiction. Id. at 838.
80. Id. at 837. In reaching its conclusion the court noted that the Agreement was
remedial and hence should be liberally construed in favor of those it was intended
to aid. Id. at 836. The Agreement itself states, "[t]his agreement shall be liberally
construed so as to effectuate its purposes." 18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. IX (1970).
81. 413 F. Supp. 138 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
82. 498 F.2d at 373.
83. 413 F. Supp. at 140.
84. See notes 13, 14 &accompanying text supra.
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been necessary to protect those concerns. The court could have held
simply that the Agreement must be utilized when it is available, and that
if other means of transferring prisoner custody are employed when available, the transfers will be deemed to have been made subject to the Agreement's prohibitions and sanctions.8 5 As it stands, the Mauro holding
could be interpreted as a judicial repeal of the writ of habeas corpus ad
6
prosequendum.a
In equating writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum and detainers on
policy grounds, the Mauro court very briefly discussed the operation of
both.8 7 Essentially repeating the language of the Senate Report, the court
stated that a detainer is a notification filed with prison authorities that
there are criminal charges in another jurisdication pending against a

prisoner. 8s

Prior to the Agreement, detainers operated very informally

and were often nothing more than requests to be informed of the anticipated
release date of the prisoner.8 9 The Mauro court took the position that a
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is merely a request for custody
since its operation depends on the cooperation of the incarcerating juris85. This would appear to have been Judge Mansfield's position in his dissent in
Mauro. See 544 F.2d at 597.
86. Briefly discussing the problem of a judicial repeal of the writ ad prosequendum,
the Mauro court noted that because not all states were parties to the Agreement, the
writ must still be available for those states, and thus was not repealed as to those
states. Id. at 594. The plain implication of this comment is that the writ is not
available with respect to states which are parties to the Agreement. Further, if and
when all states are parties to the Agreement, under the Mauro court's reasoning, the
writ ad prosequendum could no longer be used, since it has no force beyond that of
a detainer.
In a recent decision, the Fifth Circuit has expressly declined to follow either the holding or the reasoning of Mauro. In United States v. Scallion, 584 F.2d 1168 (5th Cir.
1977), the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit characterized the
holding of Mauro as an implied repeal of the federal writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum, finding it incredible to conclude that the writ of habeas corpus was
contemplated by the Agreement when it was never mentioned in the legislative history or the Agreement. 584 F.2d at 1173. The Scallion court devoted extensive discussion to the very same factors raised in support of the Mauro decision to reach the
opposite conclusion, and this despite the court's recognition of a procedural defect by
which the court could have avoided the question altogether. The court did not, however,
decide the issue of the effect of the writ of habeas corpus on a recalcitrant state
authority. Thus, alhtough the procedural issue may for the present avoid the existence
of a true conflict between the circuits, the Fifth Circuit has clearly rejected the position
that the Agreement is the exclusive method for transfer of prisoners for federal prosecution and set the stage for ultimate resolution of the issue by the Supreme Court.
87. Id. at 591.
88. Id.
89. See Note, The Interstate Criminal Detainer and the Sixth Amendment, 23 ARK.
L. REV. 634, 634-35 (1970).
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diction. 0 Even accepting this position, apparently drawn from the line
of cases which states that the writ operates only by the grace of comity, 9 '
it does not appear that the writ is the equivalent of a detainer. As pointed
92
out by the dissent in Mauro, at no time does the writ operate as a detainer.
It commands the production of a prisoner before the court, it is executed
immediately, and when its purpose has been served, the prisoner is returned to the state and the writ is discharged. 93 At no point does it serve
merely as notification of the existence of pending charges.
The Mauro court's acceptance of the comity doctrine was accomplished
with virtually no discussion. The court failed to note that the Supreme
Court in its most recent treatment of the writ ad prosequendum expressly
reserved decision on the issue of the writ's effect on an uncooperative
state, although it did reaffirm the policies of the comity doctrine. 94 The
Mauro court's holding appears to accept as well-settled precisely the same
issue which the Supreme Court failed to decide. Since a resolution of the
issue was not necessary to reach the result in Mauro, it would seem at best
improvident of the court to have even impliedly resolved the issue by equating detainers and writs of habeas corpus ad prosequendum.
The clear implication of the Supreme Court's reservation on the issue is
that, although comity should be resorted to first, if that fails, the federal
courts may still have further recourse. From the foregoing discussion of writs
of habeas corpus, 95 it is evident that this position must remain an open one,
at least until the Court rules directly on the issue.9 6 As that analysis attempted to show, there does not appear to be either a constitutional or statutory bar to the enforcement of the writ, and the line of authority advocating
the contrary can hardly be viewed as binding precedent. Rather, there
would appear to be substantial authority for the position that the writ can
be enforced against the states if constitutional or federal rights are interfered
with and if the federal interest is substantial.9 7 The Mauro holding that the
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

544 F.2d at 592.
See, e.g., Lunsford v. Hudspeth, 126 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1942).
544 F.2d at 595-96.
Id.
Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961).
Carbo addressed the issue of

the territorial limits of a federal court's jurisdiction to issue the writ ad prosequendum.
Briefly discussing the comity doctrine, the Court stated, "[iln view of the cooperation
extended by the New York authorities in honoring the writ, it is unnecessary to decide
what would be the effect of a similar writ absent such cooperation." Id. at 621 n.20.
95. See notes 23-51 & accompanying text, supra.

96. As pointed out by the Mauro dissent, this point has never been squarely before
a federal court. 544 F.2d at 596.
97. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S. (13

1977]

Casenotes

writ and detainers are equivalent is entirely inconsistent with this possibility.
Within the limits of the Agreement, the imprisoning jurisdiction is granted
wide latitude as to whether it will comply with a request for custody after
a detainer is filed. 98 Even where the Agreement would appear to permit
no discretion,9 9 the few cases that have faced the issue have held that there
is no remedy within the Agreement against the imprisoning jurisdiction for
noncompliance.' 0 0 Thus, whatever the ultimate status of the comity doctrine,
the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum clearly does not operate as a detainer, even under the Agreement. The language and effect of the Mauro
court's holding that the writ and detainers are equivalent amounts to a judicial repeal of the ad prosequendum section of the habeas corpus empowering
statute. That it was reached by inference and implication without examination of underlying policies does not mitigate the possibility that the court may
ultimately have to repudiate the plain meaning of that holding. 10 1 The policy
considerations of the comity doctrine, though important to our federal system,
are not so important that they justify an unreasoned rejection of possible
countervailing factors.
As noted by the dissent in Mauro,'0 2 a federal-state confrontation raising
this issue has not yet come before the federal courts, 10 3 and thus the literal
implication of the court's language may appear to be of little moment. However, the establishment of the speedy trial right as fundamental to due process
and the promulgation of standards to enforce it over the last decade have
increased the possibility of a situation arising which would be beyond solubility by the comity doctrine. The speedy trial right has been clearly secured
for prisoners vis-A-vis the indicting jurisdiction;10 4 but no corresponding right
Wall) 397 (1871). "It is an exceedingly delicate jurisdiction given to the Federal
courts [so that u]nless this case be of such an exceptional nature, we ought not to
encourage the interference of the Federal court below with the regular course of justice
in the state court."

United States ex rel. Drury v. Lewis, 200 U.S. 1, 7 (1906)

(quoting

Baker v. Grice, 169 U.S. 284, 291 (1898)).
98.

18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. I (1970).

99. E.g., forwarding the prisoner's demand for disposition of the charges underlying
a detainer. Id. § 2, art. II(b).
100. See, e.g., Davidson v. State, 18 Md. App. 61, 305 A.2d 474 (1973).
101. "Where Congress has expressly legislated in respect to a given matter that express legislation must control, in the absence of subsequent legislation equally express,
and is not overthrown by any inferences or implications to be found in such subsequent
legislation." Rosenkranz v. United States, 165 U.S. 257, 262 (1897).
102. 544 F.2d at 596.
103. State and federal prosecutors apparently try to work out any conflicts regarding
their needs for the other's prisoners. See United States v. Oliver, 523 F.2d 253, 259 (2d
Cir. 1975).
104. Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374 (1969).
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has been established to protect speedy trial rights from the action, or inaction,
of the imprisoning jurisdiction. Although the Agreement was designed in
part to provide procedures to vindicate some of these rights, those procedures
are expressly cooperative, 10 5 and there is no remedy for noncompliance by
an imprisoning state. While no federal court has yet dismissed an indictment for delays occasioned by an imprisoning state, the possibility plainly
exists. 10 6 Whether grounded in the right to a speedy trial or the due process
right to a fair trial, 10 7 an unreasonable delay in trying a prisoner should result
in dismissal of the charges so long as the prisoner did not contribute to the
delay.' 0 8 In addition to possibly violating an individual's rights, a state's refusal to surrender temporary custody of a prisoner pursuant to a request
under the Agreement by federal authorities would interfere with the operation and enforcement of federal law. If the Agreement were the sole
recourse for the federal government, the states would be free to frustrate what
may be a substantial federal interest. Certainly, the federal government does
not have a substantial interest in prosecuting all state prisoners against whom
it has indictments. But adherence to the holding of Mauro would render
futile even a case-by-case inquiry into the nature of the federal interest.
Having equated detainers with the writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum,
the Mauro court must either accept that the unavailability of the writ as an
alternative for vindicating a federal interest when the procedures of the
Agreement have failed, or it must reject its own holding. As already noted' 09
there is precedent for federal intervention when state action interferes with
substantial federal interests. Mauro unnecessarily undercuts a "traditional
and time-honored"' "10 method which could vindicate those interests.
III.

CONCLUSION

The problem with Mauro is that it presumes too much and explains too
little. Without discussion, and apparently with little examination, the court
has created precedent for a position which, upon closer examination, may
need to be rejected. Mauro has reduced an uncertain body of law to the
105.

18 U.S.C. app. § 2, art. 1 (1970).

106. See United States v. Ricketson, 498 F.2d 367, 372-73 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 965 (1974); United States v. Cabral, 475 F.2d 715, 720 (lst Cir. 1973); United
States v. Taddeo, 434 F.2d 228, 229 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 944 (1970). These
cases concerned delays occasioned by federal prosecutors.
107. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
108. Strunk v. United States, 412 U.S. 434 (1973).
109. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1858); Tarble's Case, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall) 397 (1871).
110. 544 F.2d at 591.
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maxim that a writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum is a detainer. The
court was undoubtedly correct in attempting to limit the ability of parties to
the Agreement to circumvent its purposes and sanctions. Such remedial legislation deserves to be construed according to substance rather than form. The
Agreement is limited, however, both in purpose and procedure, and courts
should carefully examine the impact of their holdings before extending them
unnecessarily. Until the Supreme Court resolves the remaining problems
both with the Agreement and in the speedy trial area, Mauro has left the
writ of habeas corpus ad prosequendum an uneasy presence in our legal
system.
F. John Oshoway

